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This paper analyses the impact of trade liberalization in a model where heterogeneous
ﬁrms can freely oﬀshore their production. Firms choose whether to produce, and if so
whether to sell on the domestic market only or on the export market as well. Simulta-
neously, they also choose where to locate their production. The paper shows that the
interaction between heterogeneity in ﬁrm productivity and the possibility of oﬀshoring pro-
duction dramatically alters the impact of trade liberalization. Three main results emerge
from this interaction:
i) Intra-industry factor reallocation towards the most productive ﬁrms, which is induced
by trade liberalization, operates at the world level, but not necessarily at the country level
and thus trade liberalization can lead to average productivity losses in some countries; ii)
Trade liberalization may reverse country specialization independently of any country size
eﬀect; iii) The relation between trade liberalization and trade growth is non-linear, even in
the absence of trade in intermediate goods.
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11 Introduction
Newly available ﬁrm-level data oﬀer a strong evidence of an important dispersion in size and
productivity among ﬁrms even in narrowly deﬁned industries. The data show that only a small
fraction of ﬁrms export and that exporters are larger and more productive than non-exporters
(see Eaton et al 2004, Bernard and Jensen 2004, Bernard et al 2007). This new evidence led
to the introduction into new trade theories of ﬁrm eﬃciency heterogeneity. Probably the most
inﬂuential model, achieved by Melitz (2003), allows the analysis of the coexistence of ﬁrms with
diﬀerent productivity levels within general equilibrium analysis.1 This recent literature highlights
that trade is carried out by the most eﬃcient ﬁrms, and that trade liberalization induces average
productivity gains through the reallocation of factors towards those ﬁrms. Importantly, this
literature assumes that ﬁrms stay in their country of origin and therefore do not choose the
location of their production.
The ongoing trend of world globalization, however, is leading to a large reorganization of
production location across countries. According to UNCTAD, world FDI inﬂows rose by 600%
from 1990 to 2000 to reach 1.4 trillion dollars in 2000. Moreover, the growing share of intra-ﬁrm
trade, which accounts for roughly one third of world trade (see Zeile, 1997, Antras, 2003), also
provides evidence that ﬁrms relocate at least part of their production abroad. This important
transformation of the world economy naturally pushes forward the question of countries’ attrac-
tiveness as a major issue in the public debate. But the eﬃciency of ﬁrms which oﬀshore their
production is a marginal concern in this debate.
The literature has already widely explored these two important stylized facts, both theo-
retically and empirically, but has not focused on the interaction between oﬀshoring and ﬁrm
heterogeneity and its consequences on countries’ average productivity and trade patterns. This
paper aims to ﬁll this gap on the theoretical side.
In order to do so, we introduce the possibility for ﬁrms to freely oﬀshore their production
in a Melitz-type framework. In this context, we show how the impact of trade liberalization on
1See also Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003).
2a country’s average productivity and trade patterns depends on the productivity of ﬁrms that
decide to oﬀshore their production. The interaction between oﬀshoring and ﬁrm heterogeneity
yields three results that contrast with the existing literature and are worth highlighting:
First, the intra-industry factor reallocation towards the most productive ﬁrms induced by
trade liberalization operates at the world level, but not necessarily at the country level. With
ﬁrm heterogeneity, the impact of trade integration is to eliminate those ﬁrms with the lowest
productivity as well as to enable the largest and most productive ﬁrms to expand (Melitz, 2003).
With the possibility of oﬀshoring, this story of how trade liberalization increases aggregate pro-
ductivity in all countries through a self-selection process becomes more complex. Indeed, the
self-selection mechanism is also aﬀected by the possibility of oﬀshoring when ﬁrms are heteroge-
neous. If trade integration leads the most productive ﬁrms to relocate, aggregate productivity
in the country that experiences this outﬂow of ﬁrms may actually fall. This paper shows that
such a scenario is possible for high-wage countries.
Second, trade liberalization may reverse country specialization independently of any country
size eﬀect. Since trade is carried out by the most eﬃcient ﬁrms, the net exporter of the man-
ufactured good is the country that attracts the most productive ﬁrms, and not necessarily the
one that is the most attractive overall. As trade gets freer, we show that the location choices
of the most productive ﬁrms change. This result is a novel theoretical explanation of how trade
liberalization may reverse "ex ante" comparative advantage. Indeed, the trade literature only
provides explanations for this possibility through the Home Market Eﬀect (see Laussel and Paul,
2007, for a recent contribution).
Third, trade liberalization may increase world trade growth in a non-linear way without any
international fragmentation of the production process. This last result provides an alternative
explanation of an empirical fact analyzed by Yi (2003): The response of world trade growth to
a change in tariﬀs is highly non-linear. As shown by Yi (2003), this empirical fact is diﬃcult
to rationalize using standard trade models. His explanation is based on international trade in
intermediate goods. Using a Ricardian model of trade, he shows that trade liberalization induces
3a fragmentation of the production process over a larger range of countries, which increases the
number of trade ﬂows per ﬁnal good sold. Similarly to Yi (2003), we ﬁnd a non-linear response
of world trade growth to a decrease in trade costs even if we do not model intermediate inputs.
These results are the consequences of the interaction between oﬀshoring and ﬁrm heterogene-
ity. They would not hold in a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms but without oﬀshoring, nor in a
model with symmetric ﬁrms and oﬀshoring.
In this paper, we deﬁne oﬀshoring in the following way: A ﬁrm producing a good and choosing
to oﬀshore its production abroad stops production at home and transfers all the production
process to another country. An important aspect of our analysis concerns the productivity of the
ﬁrm and how it is aﬀected by the decision to locate production abroad. In the existing literature,
the presence of wage diﬀerentials between countries is considered as one of the main motives for
ﬁrms to oﬀshore their production. In this case, the direct consequence of oﬀshoring is that the
observed productivity of a ﬁrm is necessarily aﬀected by its new location. It is however less clear
why this oﬀshoring decision should aﬀect the idiosyncratic productivity of the ﬁrm. We will thus
assume that the ﬁrm is able to freely "travel" with its idiosyncratic productivity.2
We ﬁrst develop a two-country variant of the model by Chaney (2008), which serves as a
benchmark. 3Speciﬁcally, we assume that the two countries are symmetric in all ways except in
their labor input coeﬃcient in the numeraire sector. This generates a comparative advantage, as
well as an incentive for some ﬁrms to relocate their production to the other country.
We ﬁrst display the model’s conclusions concerning average productivity and trade patterns
when ﬁrms are immobile. We then relax the assumption commonly made in the literature that
ﬁrms stay in their country of origin and allow them to freely oﬀshore their production.
Since ﬁrms diﬀer in productivity levels, we are able to determine their incentives to choose
2This assumption is also motivated by the fact that the ﬁrm is solely deﬁned by its productivity in these
models. If the ﬁrm was forced to draw another productivity level when oﬀshoring its production abroad, it would
be less clear how and why we should consider this ﬁrm as the same.
3His model reproduces the main mechanisms of Melitz’s model, but is static rather than dynamic. This
simpliﬁcation, together with the introduction of a numeraire sector that can be freely traded, leads to a more
tractable model. The main cost of this simpliﬁcation is that it is no longer possible to consider a free entry
condition per se (i.e. the number of potential entrants is ﬁxed), but rather an endogenous number of ﬁrms in
equilibrium.
4to exit the market, to produce domestically or to export as well, in each market, with respect to
their productivity. The number of ﬁrms, their status (domestic or exporter), and the location of
their production are thus endogenously determined in this version of the model. By comparing
the results obtained with and without ﬁrm mobility, we stress the impact of oﬀshoring and infer
the three results presented above.
Several implications of ﬁrm heterogeneity have been analyzed in the trade literature. Im-
portantly for this paper, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) have studied ﬁrms’ decisions to
make foreign direct investments. The possibility of making foreign direct investments in order
to produce domestically in both countries is not taken into account in our model, since it would
lead to very similar results to those provided by the above authors and would not aﬀect the main
qualitative results of the paper.
Firm heterogeneity has also been introduced in economic geography models. A ﬁrst attempt
to tackle this issue was provided by Baldwin and Okubo (2006). Based on a simple economic
geography model, they show that the most eﬃcient ﬁrms should relocate ﬁrst towards larger
countries, implying that standard empirical measures of agglomeration economies are biased and
likely to be overestimated. Their results depend, however, on the initial distribution of ﬁrms
between countries. A more recent paper (Okubo et al 2009) introduces two kinds of ﬁrms (low
and high-cost ﬁrms) in an economic geography model with a quadratic utility function. They
show that high and low productivity ﬁrms do not have the same location incentives, leading to a
spatial sorting of ﬁrms. This feature is also present in this paper, but is enriched by a selection
between domestic ﬁrms and exporters. The papers mentioned consider all ﬁrms as exporters
and therefore cannot tackle the issue of factor reallocations from domestic ﬁrms to exporters.
Neither do they provide clear conclusions on trade patterns for the same reason. In this paper, we
simultaneously endogenize the location of production and ﬁrms’ decisions to export with respect
to trade costs, which allows an assessment of the impact of oﬀshoring on average productivity
and trade patterns.
Another recent body of research has studied the consequences of the possibility of oﬀshoring
parts of the production process on ﬁrm boundaries (see Antras, 2003 & 2005, Antras and Help-
5man, 2004, Grossman and Helpman, 2003 & 2005). A central question in this literature is how
trade liberalization changes the incentives to oﬀshore parts of the production process through
foreign direct investments or through outsourcing inputs from independent foreign suppliers.
Another stream in this literature studies how the possibility of oﬀshoring some "tasks" in the
production process amends the conclusions of the Hecksher-Olhin model (Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2006, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007). Here, we do not consider diﬀerent modes
of organizations. This simplifying assumption, however, allows us to easily deal with factor re-
allocations among ﬁrms due to trade liberalization, and gives the possibility of studying trade
patterns in a general equilibrium analysis. This in turn enables us to single out the consequences
of the interaction between oﬀshoring and ﬁrm heterogeneity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic assump-
tions of the model in a closed economy framework. In section 3, we study the open economy
equilibrium, when ﬁrms are forced to stay in their country of origin. This case serves as a bench-
mark. In section 4, we study the open equilibrium with oﬀshoring and derive the main results
of this paper. Concluding remarks are provided in section 5.
2 Model Framework: Closed Economy
2.1 Demand
Preferences of a representative consumer in country j are depicted by a quasi-linear utility
function U with preference parameter μ, and a CES sub-utility function over the continuum of
varieties produced in sector M:






where σ>1 and μ>0 (1)
CM and CN denote consumption of the M composite manufactured good and the numeraire
good, respectively. Ω is the set of available varieties that has to be determined in equilibrium.
The constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by σ. The parameter μ
6measures the demand for the composite good. The use of a quasi-linear utility function ensures
that expenditures devoted to the composite manufacturing good are constant (and equal to μ),
whatever the level of income.













where pi is the price of variety i, Lj the population in country j,a n dPj is the perfect price
index in this country.
Importantly, we interpret the perfect price index as an inverse index of market competition. In
this paper, we will therefore say that market competition strengthens when the perfect price index
in market j decreases. Indeed, in this case the market share of ﬁrm i will decrease independently
of market size, preferences and ﬁrms’ idiosyncratic marginal costs. The perfect price index in
country j can decrease if average marginal costs are lower and/or if the number of ﬁrms operating
in this market increases. Note that with our deﬁnition of market competition we do not refer to
a change in mark-ups, which in our model are constant, due to the CES nature of preferences.4
2.2 Production
The numeraire good is produced under perfect competition with αj units of labour per unit of
output. Hence, normalizing the price of good N to one, the wage in country j is 1
αj.
Any operating ﬁrm i in the M sector bears a ﬁxed overhead labor cost CD,5 and a constant
marginal production cost ai. The cost of producing q units of good i with marginal cost ai in
4Note that Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) have a diﬀerent deﬁnition and refer to market competition as a change
in mark-ups.
5This ﬁxed cost reﬂects the cost of building a plant, and also all costs entailed by the legal system and the
standards applied in the country.
7country j is thus:
Ci(q)=( aiq + CD)wj (3)
Given the demand function (2), the optimal price charged by ﬁrm i is a constant mark-up
over its marginal cost. Hence, a ﬁrm with marginal cost ai will charge a price pi = σ
σ−1aiwj.I t















i − wjCD (4)
We call market access the component of demand addressed to a ﬁrm which is independent
of its productivity and thus common to all ﬁrms. The other component of demand is speciﬁc to
the ﬁrm; its marginal cost ai.
We follow Chaney (2008) in assuming that ﬁrm marginal costs are drawn from a Pareto dis-
tribution. This assumption is becoming increasingly common (see for instance Do and Levchenko
2008, Arkolakis 2008). Not only motivated by empirical evidence (see Axtell, 2001, Luttmer,
2007), this assumption also allows us to make simple analytic statements in the model without
oﬀshoring and to make results easily comparable with Chaney (2008) and Helpman et al (2004).
However, the main results derived in the model with oﬀshoring do not depend on this assumption.
Precisely, we assume that marginal costs are comprised between 0 and 1 and that these
marginal costs are drawn from a Pareto distribution F(a) with a shape parameter ρ:
F(a)=( a)
ρ , with 0 <a<1 (5)
Finally, we assume that there is a group of entrepreneurs proportional to the size of the
country. Hence, the total mass of potential entrants in country j is ﬁxed and proportional to Lj.
82.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, each active ﬁrm earns non-negative proﬁts. Equation (4) deﬁnes the proﬁt ex-
pression for any ﬁrm and thus deﬁnes the least eﬃcient active ﬁrm in the economy. We label as










Firms which have drawn a marginal cost above aD choose not to produce, whereas ﬁrms
which have drawn a marginal cost below aD realize pure proﬁts and constitute the mass of active
ﬁrms in equilibrium.6


































The marginal cost drawn by the least eﬃcient ﬁrm is lower, the higher the ﬁxed cost CD and
the wage wj, since an increase in any of those two increases the cost function for a given quantity
produced. This threshold, together with F(a), is suﬃcient to determine the mass of active ﬁrms
in equilibrium.
This allows to compute the inverse of the average productivity, what we can call the average
marginal cost in this economy, which we denote by   aj. We deﬁne the average marginal cost as the
mean quantity of labor that is used to produce one good M in this economy.7 Accordingly, the
average marginal cost is computed as the arithmetic mean of the marginal costs drawn, weighted






a1−σ and the distribution
dF(a):
6Parameters are chosen such that aD < 1.
7This deﬁnition is slightly diﬀerent from Melitz (2003), who computes the average marginal cost (actually
the average productivity) as the mean quantity of labor that is used to "produce" one unit of the representative
consumer’s welfare. While very similar, we will clarify below why we prefer the measure used here.
9  aj =
Lj
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We now consider two open economies A and B, that engage in international trade.
Trade in good N is assumed to be costless, while trade in the composite good M is costly,
forcing ﬁrms that engage in international trade to incur both variable and ﬁxed costs. Variable
trade costs take the standard form of iceberg trade costs, so that for one unit of a good to be
delivered, τ>1 units must be shipped. This variable cost increases the marginal selling cost
and thus the consumer price for imported varieties.
The ﬁxed cost of participating in the export market is CX, which, like the domestic ﬁxed
cost, is an overhead labor cost. The ﬁxed cost of exporting is consistent with the need to obtain
information about the foreign market, the need to alter product characteristics in order to meet
market-speciﬁc standards, and the need to create a distribution network in the foreign country.8
The literature provides much evidence for the presence of such costs in export markets (see Das
et al, 2006, for an estimation of these sunk costs for Columbian manufacturing plants).
The two countries are perfectly symmetric except for their labor input coeﬃcients in the
production of good N (αj). Speciﬁcally, we assume that αB =1and αA = 1
γ with γ>1,
introducing a comparative advantage in good N for country A.
Free trade in good N ensures price equalization across countries. Besides, perfect competition
forces marginal cost pricing in both countries, which induces the world price of good N to be
such that: pW
N = wB = wa
γ .9 Using good N as a numeraire, we normalize pW
N to one which pins
8Many papers highlight the importance of sunk costs associated with engaging in international trade. We
consider here ﬁxed rather than sunk costs, as in Yeaple (2005) and Chaney (2008), since the framework considered
is static.
9We assume that μ is suﬃciently low to ensure that both countries produce the numeraire good.
10down wages in the two countries: wB =1<w a = γ.
3.1 Firm selection
Most related papers impose a condition on the size of export ﬁxed costs and variable trade
costs relative to domestic ﬁxed costs in order to avoid any incentive for ﬁrms to serve the foreign
market without serving their domestic market, and thus act as export-platforms. Here, we assume
instead that ﬁrms cannot export if they do not also serve their domestic market. Accordingly,
ﬁrms choose to be exporters only if their pure proﬁts from serving both local and foreign markets
are larger than those from their local market only.





































 1−σ and φ = τ1−σ, which is an index of trade freeness, ranging from 0 to 1.
Each ﬁrm chooses its status (D or X) so as to maximize its proﬁts, taking the decision of all
other ﬁrms as given. The partitioning of ﬁrms among status thus depends exclusively on their
marginal costs:
DA ﬁrm if πDA(ai) ≥ πXA(ai) and πDA(ai) ≥ 0
XA ﬁrm if πXA(ai) ≥ πDA(ai) and πXA(ai) ≥ 0
DB ﬁrm if πDB(ai) ≥ πXB(ai) and πDB(ai) ≥ 0
XB ﬁrm if πXB(ai) ≥ πDB(ai) and πXB(ai) ≥ 0
(14)
An active domestic ﬁrm therefore decides to become an exporter if the additional proﬁts
from export sales cover at least the extra ﬁxed costs implied by the decision to export. The more
proﬁtable a ﬁrm is (lower ai), the larger the additional proﬁts from exporting. Hence, the most
11eﬃcient ﬁrms decide to export while less eﬃcient ﬁrms serve their domestic market only.
3.2 Equilibrium
Each ﬁrm chooses its status taking the decision of the other ﬁrms as given. We label as aDj
the marginal cost drawn by the least eﬃcient domestic ﬁrm in country j, which is indiﬀerent
between exiting the market or being a domestic ﬁrm. Similarly, aXj is the marginal cost drawn
by the least eﬃcient export ﬁrm in country j, which is indiﬀerent between serving both markets



























Firms in market j that have drawn a a>a Dj do not produce, while if aXj <a≤ aDj,t h e y
serve the domestic market only and if a ≤ aXj, they serve both their domestic market and the
foreign market (with j = A,B).10
These threshold deﬁnitions determine the status of each ﬁrm with respect to its marginal cost




































The deﬁnition of the marginal cost thresholds for domestic ﬁrms in (15) may be interpreted as
the free entry conditions in each country, since they deﬁne the marginal cost for which domestic
pure proﬁts are equal to zero. Given F(a), these cutoﬀs determine the mass of active ﬁrms in
10If aXj ≥ 1, there is no partitioning of ﬁrms between the domestic and export markets since all ﬁrms export.










































































The model diﬀers from that of Chaney (2008) in assuming a diﬀerent labor input coeﬃcient
in the production of good N, inducing a wage gap between the two countries. Production of good
M is cheaper in country B, which allows more ﬁrms to enter this market (for both domestic and
exporting ﬁrms: aDB >a DA and aXB >a XA, see ﬁgure 1). This leads to an important departure
from the standard symmetric model: market competition does not equalize between countries.
Production of good M being cheaper in market B, this market hosts more ﬁrms in equilibrium.
This feature can be measured by the ratio of the two price indices:   P =
PA
PB. Intuitively, this
ratio is higher than 1, because country B hosts more ﬁrms. Put diﬀerently, ﬁrms in country A
should beneﬁt from a greater demand in order to make enough proﬁts to cover the higher ﬁxed
cost induced by the higher unit labor cost. It follows that market access has to be larger in
country A for both domestic and exporting ﬁrms. The calculation of the relative perfect price
index   P allows to capture how this measure of relative competition between the two countries
evolves with trade liberalization:




























∂   P
∂φ
> 0 (23)
The relative price index   P is greater than 1 as soon as γ>1. Note that ∂   P
∂φ > 0, which means
that a decrease in trade costs magniﬁes the market competition diﬀerential between the two
countries. Both countries beneﬁt from trade liberalization (
∂Pj
∂φ < 0 for j = A,B) but country B







When ﬁrms cannot oﬀshore their production, country B is a net exporter of good M, for any
level of trade costs. Trade liberalization always increases its trade surplus in good M .
To foster intuition, ﬁgure 1 shows how each marginal cost threshold reacts to a decrease in
trade costs.
3.3 Average productivity
In Melitz (2003), the measure of average productivity is made possible by the symmetry of the
countries, which ensures that exports are the mirror image of imports. Melitz’s measure of
average productivity cannot however be readily used in our setup with asymmetric countries.
We therefore use a measure of average productivity based on production, not on utility as in
Melitz.12
The inverse of the average productivity in each country, i.e. what we call the average marginal
cost, is computed following the methodology presented in the closed economy section. We must
12A measure of average productivity based on utility should take into account the average productivity of
imports rather than exports, but this in turn could no longer be understood as the average productivity in a
country if imports and exports are not perfectly symmetric.
14Figure 1: Marginal cost thresholds and trade liberalization














however take into account the asymmetry of market access between countries for each ﬁrm status.
This implies that two ﬁrms having drawn the same marginal cost in each country do not have
the same size, because they do not beneﬁt from the same market access. Consequently, we must
weight the marginal cost of each ﬁrm by its speciﬁc market access in order to obtain a consistent
measure of the average marginal cost in each country:
  aA =
  aXA
0 a ∗ φsB(a)dF(a)da +
  aDA





  aB =
  aXB
0 a ∗ φsA(a)dF(a)da +
  aDB






where sj(a) is the distribution of sales in location j, net of possible trade costs.
15The average marginal cost decreases in both countries under falling trade costs, due to the
reallocation eﬀect put forward in Melitz (2003): the least eﬃcient ﬁrms in each market are forced
to exit, new ﬁrms become exporters, and the intensive margin of the exporters grows. Each of
these eﬀects leads to lower the average marginal cost in both countries.
Lemma 2:
When ﬁrms cannot oﬀshore their production, trade liberalization induces intra-industry factor
reallocations towards the most productive ﬁrms and leads to eﬃciency gains in all countries, for
any unit labor cost diﬀerential.
The above analysis has presented a static two-country model of trade with heterogeneous
ﬁrms, introducing a comparative advantage in the numeraire good for country A.W e h a v e ,
however, assumed so far that ﬁrms are forced to produce in their country of origin, i.e. the country
where they have drawn their marginal cost. We now investigate the consequences of relaxing this
assumption in order to emphasize how oﬀshoring, in interaction with ﬁrm heterogeneity, alters
the standard results presented above.
4 Oﬀshoring
This section develops a variant of the previously described model, in which ﬁrms are allowed to
freely oﬀshore their production to the other country. While the assumption of costless oﬀshoring
may seem extreme, it allows to emphasize how oﬀshoring aﬀects trade patterns and average
productivity in each country. We assume that ﬁrms simultaneously choose their status (non-
producer, domestic producer or exporter) and the location of their production (A or B). This
gives four possibilities for active ﬁrms, deﬁning four ﬁrm types: to be a domestic ﬁrm in country
A or country B; to be an exporter in country A or country B. Since we have assumed no costs
associated with oﬀshoring, ﬁrm’s country of origin has no impact on its decision.13
13An extension of this model with ﬁxed costs associated with any oﬀshoring decision yields the same qualitative
results as those presented in this section if oﬀshoring costs are not too high. It would however imply that the
ﬁrm’s country of origin would play a role in its decision, i.e. two ﬁrms with the same marginal costs but not
located in the same country may take diﬀerent decisions.
16In this version of the model, the number of active ﬁrms, their status (D or X) as well as their
location (A or B) are thus endogenous.
4.1 Firms selection
Formally, the proﬁt expressions are the same as in the previous section (see equations 10 to
13). However, ﬁrms now face two additional possibilities and thus compare the proﬁts that they
would make in each of the four possible situations. The optimal strategy of a ﬁrm depends only
on its marginal cost. Indeed, as is standard in Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition models,
ﬁrms are small enough such that they interact neither in their price decisions nor in their status
and location decisions. Each ﬁrm thus chooses the type that maximizes its proﬁts in equilibrium,
taking the decision of all other ﬁrms as given. We can summarize the ﬁrms’ decisions as follows:
DA Firm if πDA(ai) ≥
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




≥ 0 DB Firm if πDB(ai) ≥
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨





XA Firm if πXA(ai) ≥
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




≥ 0 XB Firm if πXB(ai) ≥
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






It is worth noting that the presence of four possible ﬁrm types does not mean that all these
types necessarily coexist in equilibrium for all levels of trade costs. As an example, exporting
ﬁrms in A do not operate when trade is perfectly free, since they would have access to the same
world market as exporting ﬁrms from B, but they would incur a higher unit labor cost.14
We must therefore determine the existing ﬁrm types in equilibrium with respect to variable
trade costs φ. This allows us to compute both price indexes as a function of existing ﬁrm types
14Wages could adjust in this model, for instance by introducing diminishing returns to scale in the numeraire
sector. This would however make the model much more diﬃcult to solve. Also, the results we present come from
the diﬀerent location incentives of large and small ﬁrms, based on the wage diﬀerential between the two countries.
As long as country A is still the high wage country, the results hold.
17and solve for the equilibrium with respect to trade costs.
First, we present a formal method for determining the existing ﬁrm types in equilibrium.15
4.1.1 Formal conditions for the existence of a ﬁrm type
Suppose that ﬁrms can choose their type among m possible ﬁrm types, where each of these ﬁrm
types is characterized by an exogenous ﬁxed cost. We rank these m possible ﬁrm types with
respect to their exogenous ﬁxed cost, from the cheapest to the costliest.16 Thus, type 1 has the
lowest ﬁxed cost while type m has the highest. Type l (l ∈ (2;m)) must provide a larger market
access than any "cheaper" type (types 1 to l − 1), in order to generate larger sales (and proﬁts)
to cover the higher ﬁxed cost. Otherwise, no ﬁrm would choose type l since proﬁts would be
less than those obtained under another type. This result is independent of the ﬁrms’ marginal
cost since market access and ﬁxed costs are common to all ﬁrms. Importantly, this condition is
necessary but not suﬃcient to ensure the presence of ﬁrm type l. It follows that:
Lemma 3:
A ﬁrm type characterized by a lower market access and a higher ﬁxed cost than any other
ﬁrm type cannot exist in equilibrium.
Corollary: In equilibrium, the ranking of existing ﬁrm types with respect to their ﬁxed cost
must be the same as the one with respect to their market access.
Proof. see appendix A
This ﬁrst step eliminates a number of possible ﬁrm types. This leaves us with n diﬀerent
types (with n ≤ m) ranked similarly with respect to their ﬁxed cost and their market access.
However, we must ensure that each of these possible ﬁrm types maximizes the proﬁts of a subset
of ﬁrms in order to be present in equilibrium. We now provide the condition for this.
15The interest in going through this methodology is twofold. In this model, it is possible to know which ﬁrm
types will coexist in equilibrium. In addition, the same methodology can be applied to any other heterogeneous
ﬁrm trade model with any number of diﬀerent types considered, including diﬀerent organizational modes for ﬁrms
(FDI, outsourcing, export plateforms), and could be extended to a model with n countries. This methodology
however only applies if there is no strategic interaction among ﬁrms and if ﬁxed costs are independent of their
decisions.
16In our model, m =4 , but this method could be applied for any m>1.
18Deﬁne as al+1 the marginal cost of the ﬁrm that is indiﬀerent between types l+1and l (given
by πl+1(al+1)=πl(al+1)). Considering only these two types, all ﬁrms with a marginal cost below
al+1 will prefer type l +1instead of type l, while all ﬁrms with a marginal cost above al+1 will
prefer type l rather than l+1. We can thus deﬁne n−1 marginal cost thresholds, each of which
splits the mass of active ﬁrms into two groups, considering two "neighboring" types according
to the above-deﬁned ranking. Note that lemma 3 ensures that al > 0, for l ∈{ 2;n}. The nth
marginal cost threshold is given by the zero proﬁt condition. Indeed, type 1 cannot be compared
with a "cheaper" type. Firms that are not productive enough to make positive proﬁts under type
1 exit the world market. This last threshold thus deﬁnes the marginal cost of the ﬁrm that is
indiﬀerent between entering the (world) market and not operating (and is given by π1(a1)=0 ).
Thanks to the distribution of marginal costs among ﬁrms, this marginal cost also drives the mass
of active ﬁrms in equilibrium (given by 2F(a1)).
We obtain the suﬃcient condition for the existence of each possible ﬁrm type from:
Lemma 4:
A ﬁrm type l exists in equilibrium if and only if al+1 <a l, and al > 0.
Proof. see appendix B
The above lemma ensures that marginal costs thresholds are ranked inversely with respect to
their indexes (l) in equilibrium. Firm types that do not respect this condition cannot be chosen
by any ﬁrm in equilibrium. We thus have k ≤ n types that respect this condition.
It follows that a ﬁrm with a marginal cost ai such that al+1 <a i <a l will choose type l.
Firms with marginal costs above a1 will exit the (world), market while ﬁrms with a marginal
cost below ak will choose type k.
4.1.2 Existence of ﬁrm types with respect to trade costs in the model
We can now determine which ﬁrm types exist in our model, for any level of trade costs. A
decrease in trade costs indeed aﬀects the market access of each ﬁrm type. As a consequence, the
presence of a given ﬁrm type depends on the level of trade costs.
Quite naturally, we assume that the ﬁxed cost of being an export ﬁrm is always higher
19than that of being a domestic ﬁrm worldwide.17 Given that we have assumed that A is more
expensive than B (γ>1), we can rank ﬁxed costs from the cheapest to the costliest as follows:
D B<D A<X B<XA .
We further restrict the parameters in order to concentrate on the case where some domestic
ﬁrms operate in the two countries for any level of trade costs.18 Not only is this case the only
realistic and interesting one according to micro-level data, it also allows us to focus on the
decision whether to export or not and from where, which drives trade patterns.
We turn to the existence of exporting ﬁrms in each country with respect to trade costs. As
long as trade costs are not inﬁnite (φ>0), some ﬁrms always choose to export. Their location
choice however depends on the level of trade costs.
According to lemma 3, since XA is the "costliest" type considered, the presence of some
exporting ﬁrms in country A only requires that they beneﬁt from a larger market access than
any other type. When this is veriﬁed, all ﬁrms with a marginal cost below aXA choose to export
from country A. Formally, we obtain that the marginal cost of the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between
exporting from A and from B (aXA) is characterized by:
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Hence, some ﬁrms export from country A in equilibrium only if trade costs are high enough.19
17We therefore assume that the ﬁxed cost of being an exporter from country B (CX + CD) is larger than that
paid by a domestic ﬁrm in country A (γCD), leading to the assumtion that CX − (γ − 1)CD > 0.
18Intuitively, these parameters restrictions must verify that the elasticity of substitution σ and the labor cost
diﬀerential γ are not too large for some domestic ﬁrms to choose to locate in A rather than B, while the ﬁxed cost
of exporting CX must be high enough compared to CD to ensure that some ﬁrms always prefer to be domestic
in A rather than being exporters in B.
19Formally, we should also check the existence of export ﬁrms in A if no ﬁrm chooses to export from B (i.e.
if ﬁrm type XB does not exist in equilibrium). In this case, we must verify that the marginal cost of the ﬁrm
indiﬀerent between being an export ﬁrm in A or just being a domestic ﬁrm in A is positive, which is always true:
20In this case, the main determinant of the location choice is the proﬁtability of the domestic
market. Locating production in country A is costlier but, as a result, this also provides greater
local sales since competition is weaker than in market B. Therefore, the most productive ﬁrms
choose to export from A even if this is not the best location to export from. Indeed, any ﬁrm
exporting from country B would make greater proﬁts from exporting than if it were located in
country A. However, greater domestic sales in market A overcome the lower sales in the export
market.
According to lemma 4, export ﬁrms in country B only operate if aXA <a XB and aXB > 0.20
We obtain that the marginal cost of the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between exporting from B and being a
domestic ﬁrm in A (aXB) is given by:21
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A subset of ﬁrms exports from country B only if their proﬁts are greater than if they were
domestic or exporters in country A. It follows from the above condition that some exporters
operate from B only when trade is suﬃciently free, which allows them to have an easy enough
access to market A. It follows that trade costs must be low enough to provide suﬃcient sales
from exporting from B to compensate for the lower level of domestic sales compared to A.
These two trade cost thresholds determine the existence or the absence of exporting ﬁrms in
A and B, independently of the marginal cost distribution. For high trade costs (e.g. φ<φ )
no ﬁrm exports from country B, while for low trade costs (e.g. φ>φ) no ﬁrm exports from







20These conditions only apply if some ﬁrms choose to be exporters from A. If ﬁrm type XA does not exist, for
the existence of some exporters in country B, only aXB > 0 is required.
21The condition aXB > 0 also leads to a constraint on trade costs: aXB > 0 ⇔ φ>
γ
1−σ   P
σ−1−1
  P σ−1 , but the range
of φ for which aXB > 0 is larger than that ensuring aXB >a XA.
21country A. For intermediate trade costs (e.g. φ <φ<φ) ﬁrms export from both countries,
and international trade is characterized by intra-industry trade in good M between the two
countries.22
4.2 Equilibrium and intra-industry factor reallocations
The above determination of the existing ﬁrm types in equilibrium with respect to trade costs
allows us to compute price indexes for any level of trade costs and therefore solve for the equilib-
rium. For expositional ease, we only present a graphical analysis of the equilibrium with respect
to trade costs, based on the results of the previous section, which are independent of the marginal
cost distribution. We relegate to appendix D the methodology to solve for   P using the Pareto
distribution, which allows to obtain the equilibrium values of the marginal cost thresholds.
Based on the results obtained in the previous section, ﬁgure 3 shows how the choices of ﬁrms
in both countries to exit (EXIT), to remain domestic (DB, DA) and to export (XB, XA) depend
on their marginal cost (vertical axis) and on trade costs (horizontal axis):
Note that this ﬁgure is only a stylized representation of the equilibrium. Marginal cost
thresholds may evolve in a non-linear way with φ; this linear representation is only motivated
by simplicity.
4.2.1 Trade liberalization and self-selection of ﬁrms into ﬁrm types
Trade liberalization (an increase in φ) aﬀects the market access of each ﬁrm type, and as a
consequence alters the incentive to remain domestic, to export or to relocate. This eﬀect of
trade liberalization is shown in ﬁgure 3 as moving to the right from φ =0to φ =1 .
The ranking of ﬁrm types necessarily leads the most eﬃcient ﬁrms to choose to export, while
less eﬃcient ﬁrms choose to be domestic producers. The assumption of costless oﬀshoring allows
ﬁrms to freely choose their type among the four possible ones. Their country of origin has thus
no impact on their decisions.
22Intuitively, we must have φ < φ. Otherwise, no ﬁrms would export for intermediate trade costs while they
would export for large trade costs. This result can however be easily demonstrated with the Pareto distribution.







At the world level, the self-selection mechanisms present in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008)
are also present in our framework. Figure 3 shows that as trade costs decrease, the total mass
of exporters increases (the subset XA∪ XB expands). Access to the foreign market is indeed
facilitated, providing new incentives to export. This increases competition everywhere since both
markets are better integrated. As a consequence, the least eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms worldwide are
forced to exit (the subset DA∪ DB falls).
At the country level, the story is richer. As is standard in the literature, the market compe-
tition diﬀerential, induced by the wage diﬀerential, is magniﬁed as trade costs decrease (∂   P
∂φ > 0
the formal proof of this result is provided with the Pareto distribution in appendix D). Trade
liberalization thus increases the market access of exporting ﬁrms in country B more than in
23country A, and decreases the market access of domestic ﬁrms in country B more than in country
A. These eﬀects alter the location decisions of domestic and export ﬁrms.
Consider ﬁrst exporting ﬁrms. Using the results of the previous section, ﬁgure 3 shows that
for high trade costs (i.e. φ<φ ) those ﬁrms only locate in country A. However, when φ>φ ,
some ﬁrms decide to relocate and export from country B (XB expands). Interestingly, in this
model, the increase in exports from the low-wage country results from the relocation of ﬁrms
from the high-wage country. Trade liberalization increases the proﬁtability of exporting from B
faster than from A. The reason is that, as trade costs decrease, diﬀerences in production costs
become more important than market access in the choice of location. Note that exporting ﬁrms
that choose to relocate from A to B are the least eﬃcient, while domestic ﬁrms that choose to
relocate from A to B are the most eﬃcient.
The impact of trade liberalization on the location choice of domestic ﬁrms is more complex
and ambiguous. Whether domestic ﬁrms relocate from A to B or from B to A depends on two
opposite forces: on the one hand trade liberalization reduces the proﬁtability of domestic ﬁrms
everywhere, which gives incentives for domestic ﬁrms to relocate from A to B since producing
in B is cheaper. However, trade liberalization increases local competition faster in B than in A
(∂   P
∂φ > 0), which gives incentives for domestic ﬁrms to relocate from B to A. The relative strength
of these two opposite eﬀects depends on the parameters of the model. Because it is not the main
focus here, we merely show an example in ﬁgure 3 where the two eﬀects cancel out.
4.2.2 Intra-industry factor reallocations
The intra-industry reallocations from less productive to more productive ﬁrms put forward by
Melitz (2003) still operates in our model, but only at the world level. As trade costs decrease
(φ rises), the most productive domestic ﬁrms decide to engage in international trade, therefore
increasing the worldwide number of exporters, while the least eﬃcient ﬁrms are forced to exit
the (world) market, due to the increased competition. These eﬀects improve the world average
productivity of ﬁrms. However, they do not necessarily operate in both countries, because of the
24possibility of ﬁrms freely oﬀshoring their production.
When trade costs are high (i.e. φ<φ ), trade liberalization generates intra-industry factor
reallocations towards the most productive ﬁrms in country A, because the most eﬃcient domestic
ﬁrms become exporters and exporters increase in size. In country B, the exit of the least eﬃcient
ﬁrms also reallocates factors towards the most productive ﬁrms. Hence, when trade costs are
high, trade liberalization produces average productivity gains in both countries.
When trade costs are intermediate (i.e. φ <φ<φ), trade liberalization forces the least
eﬃcient ﬁrms to exit in country B, but also produces incentives for some ﬁrms in A to oﬀshore
their production in country B and export from there. These ﬁrms become the most eﬃcient ﬁrms
in this country. This tends to reallocate factors towards the most productive ﬁrms and therefore
improves average productivity in country B. In contrast, the least eﬃcient exporting ﬁrms and
the most eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms in country A oﬀshore their production to country B. The impact
of trade liberalization on average productivity in country A thus depends on the productivity of
these ﬁrms compared to the average productivity of ﬁrms remaining in the country.
Finally, when trade costs are low enough (i.e. φ>φ), trade liberalization induces intra-
industry factor reallocations towards the least eﬃcient ﬁrms in country A, since the most eﬃcient
domestic ﬁrms oﬀshore their production to country B. As a consequence, average productivity
necessarily decreases in country A. In country B, the exit of the least productive ﬁrms helps
to improve average productivity. Moreover, new ﬁrms become exporters from B. However, the
oﬀshoring of ﬁrms from country A to country B could lead to factor reallocation towards less
productive ﬁrms in country B, because these new ﬁrms may be less productive than the average
productivity in B. This composition eﬀect could lead to an average eﬃciency loss in both countries
(but not at the world level).
This analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on the oﬀshoring decisions of ﬁrms with
diﬀerent productivity levels underlines the possibility of factor reallocations from more to less
productive ﬁrms, in contrast to the situation where ﬁrms cannot choose where to locate their
production. From this follows:
25Proposition 1:
While trade liberalization necessarily induces intra-industry factor reallocation towards the
most productive ﬁrms at the world level, it can induce intra-industry factor reallocation towards
the least productive ﬁrms in the high-wage country.
According to proposition 1, trade liberalization may concentrate all eﬃciency gains in the
low wage country and induce eﬃciency losses in the other. To foster intuition, ﬁgure 4 presents
a simulation of the average marginal cost in each country. As in the previous section, average
marginal costs are computed by weighting ﬁrms’ marginal cost by their market access. The
formal expressions for the average marginal costs in the two countries are provided in appendix
C:23
Figure 3: Average marginal costs and trade liberalization








in B In A
This ﬁgure illustrates that a country may experience a fall in eﬃciency induced by trade
liberalization. Note however that our measure of average productivity being based on production
and not on utility, this fall in eﬃciency does not mean a fall in welfare.
23The parameters values used are: ρ =6 , σ =2 , μ =0 .2, CD =4 , CX =4 .5 and γ =1 .01.
26We turn now to a more precise discussion of the further consequences of the presence of both
heterogeneous ﬁrms and oﬀshoring on the direction of net trade ﬂows, and the trade response to
trade liberalization.
4.3 Trade ﬂows
The direction of trade ﬂows depends on the level of trade costs in the model. For high trade
costs, exporting ﬁrms are located in country A only, which is thus necessarily the net exporter of
good M, whereas for low trade costs, exporting ﬁrms are only located in country B, which thus
becomes the net exporter of the manufactured good after trade liberalization. Intra-industry
trade only occurs for intermediate trade costs.
This speciﬁc feature of our model means that an "ex ante" comparative advantage24 cannot
explain the direction of net trade ﬂows. This results from the interaction between ﬁrm hetero-
geneity and oﬀshoring. Indeed, section 3.2 shows that without oﬀshoring, country B is the net
exporter of the manufactured good, whatever the extent of market integration. Furthermore, it
can be shown that the same applies when ﬁrms are identical and can oﬀshore production. In
this latter case, all ﬁrms would be exporters, and the net exporter of the manufactured good
would be country B, since country B always hosts a larger share of the world manufacturing
production.
The source of this new result is that the most eﬃcient ﬁrms do not have the same location
incentives as the least eﬃcient ones. The net exporter of the manufactured good is thus not the
country that attracts the largest share of world production, but the one that attracts the most
productive ﬁrms, i.e the exporters.
To our knowledge, the existing literature in trade only provides explanations for a reversal
of net trade ﬂows induced by trade liberalization based on the Home Market Eﬀect (HME),
introduced by Krugman (1980).25 The present model proposes an alternative explanation for the
24The productivity in the numeraire sector is lower in B than in A so that B has an "ex ante" comparative
advantage in the manufactured good.
25As an example, in the same model with symmetric ﬁrms, suppose that trade costs are large and that country
A has a larger demand for good M than country B. According to the HME, this country should host a dispro-
27reversal of net trade ﬂows even if countries have identical demand for the manufactured good.
The HME is thus not at work here. In contrast to explanations based on the HME, country A
is able to be a net exporter of the manufactured good for large trade costs even if it hosts less
than 50% of the world manufacturing production, because it attracts the most eﬃcient ﬁrms:
those that export.
Proposition 2:
The interaction between ﬁrm heterogeneity and oﬀshoring is able to reverse the direction of
net trade ﬂows following trade liberalization, independently of any country size eﬀect.
This result is also important because it means that the two standard deﬁnitions of the HME,
i.e. the larger country i) attracts a disproportionate share of world production ii) is a net exporter
of the manufactured good, are not equivalent.26
4.4 Trade response to trade liberalization
Another feature of our model is its ability to produce a non-linear response of world manufactured
trade growth to variable trade costs. Indeed, Yi (2001) points out that: "the response of exports
to tariﬀs has increased sharply since the mid-1980s [...]. For example, between 1962 and 1985 the
elasticity of trade with respect to tariﬀs was 7, while between 1986 and 1999 it was 50. This non-
linear eﬀect is a qualitative puzzle from the perspective of the standard models". The theoretical
mechanism that Yi proposes to explain this non-linearity is based on the fragmentation of the
production process induced by trade liberalization. The source of non-linearity in our model can
be interpreted as a complement to the explanation by Yi. It is the non-linear response of the two
margins of trade to trade liberalization. The intuition behind this result is as follows: In the ﬁrst
phase (when trade costs are large), trade liberalization leads to an increase in exports (both on
portionate share of world production with respect to its market size and thus should be a net exporter of the
manufactured good. However, as trade costs decrease, country B becomes a more attractive location for ﬁrms
because of the cheaper unit labor cost. Beyond a threshold value of trade costs, country B becomes a net exporter
of the manufactured good.
26Indeed, according to Head et al (2002): "(the HME) means that the large country hosts a disproportionate
share of ﬁrms. Moreover, this condition implies that the large country will run a trade surplus in the increasing
returns sector". The model shows however that a country (here country B) can attract a disproportionate share
of ﬁrms while running a trade deﬁcit in the increasing returns sector.
28the intensive and the extensive margins) from the high wage country to the low wage country. The
latter being more competitive, this increase cannot be very large. In a later phase, when trade
liberalization has led exporters to relocate to the low wage country, further trade liberalization







∂φ , because ∂   P
∂φ > 0. As soon as the low wage country attracts
some exporting ﬁrms, both trade margins are more sensitive to trade liberalization, inducing a
convex non-linear response of world manufactured trade to trade liberalization. Hence:
Proposition 3:
Trade liberalization induces a convex non-linear response of world manufactured trade to trade
costs when ﬁrms can oﬀshore their production.
It is important to note that the source of this non-linearity diﬀers from that proposed by Yi
(2003), and could thus be considered as an alternative explanation for this non-linearity. In our
model, we do not introduce intermediate inputs, so this mechanism is absent.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the theoretical consequences of the interaction of two stylized
facts recently highlighted by the literature on trade. First, there is much evidence that exporting
ﬁrms are very diﬀerent in productivity and size compared to non-exporters. Second, the global-
ization process has strongly reshaped the geography of world production by creating incentives
for ﬁrms to oﬀshore their production to foreign countries. We have shown that the interaction
between these two facts has important consequences for countries’ average productivity and trade
patterns. The main idea behind this result is that it is not possible to understand the impact of
oﬀshoring without taking into account the productivity of ﬁrms that oﬀshore their production.
This question is of high political relevance. We can no longer only focus on which countries are
the most attractive for economic activities; a crucial question is which countries attract the most
eﬃcient ﬁrms. The paper further shows that trade liberalization plays an important role because
it aﬀects location incentives of large and small ﬁrms diﬀerently.
29We therefore consider that this paper sheds a new light on the importance of oﬀshoring in
shaping the impact of trade liberalization. Three important results that contrast with the exist-
ing literature emerge from this interaction: i) Trade liberalization may concentrate all average
eﬃciency gains in one country, the other country experiencing an average productivity loss. ii)
Trade liberalization can reverse the direction of net trade ﬂows, independently of any country
size eﬀect. iii) Trade liberalization may increase world trade growth in a non-linear way, even
in the absence of trade in intermediate goods. Importantly, these results would not hold if ﬁrms
were forced to stay in their country of origin, and neither would they if we had considered a
trade model with symmetric ﬁrms that have the possibility of oﬀshoring their production.
The assumption of costless oﬀshoring has been made to stress the impact of oﬀshoring in the
model, but may seem unrealistic. It would however be possible to introduce such costs, which
would allow a link to be made between the two versions of the model. If oﬀshoring costs were
prohibitive, the output of the model would be similar to the one described in section 3. A gradual
decrease in oﬀshoring costs would bring the output of the model closer to that of section 4, until
oﬀshoring costs were nil.
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32APPENDICES
A proof of lemma 3
Proof. Suppose a ﬁrm of type l has rank l + p with respect to its market access. There exist
m−l types that have higher ﬁxed costs than type l, while there exist m−l −p types that have
a larger market access. It follows that among the m − l types that have higher ﬁxed costs, at
least p of them are characterized by a lower market access than type l. These types cannot exist
in equilibrium. We can thus eliminate these ﬁrm types until p =0 . (A similar reasoning applies
if type l has rank l − p with respect to its market access).
B proof of lemma 4
Proof. Suppose that al+1 >a l. According the deﬁnition of al+1, all ﬁrms with a marginal cost
below al+1 prefer type l+1rather than l. Similarly, all ﬁrms with a marginal cost above al prefer
type l − 1 rather than l. There is thus no marginal cost for which a ﬁrm would prefer type l
considering the two alternative types l+1and l−1. Type l is strictly dominated either by type
l +1or l − 1 and thus cannot exist in equilibrium.
C Expressions for average marginal costs in each country




























































































































D Formal solution for the model with oﬀshoring:
In this appendix, we provide the solution of the model with oﬀshoring when ﬁrms’ productivity
levels are Pareto distributed. This gives a formal proof that ∂   P
∂φ > 0.
When trade costs are high (i.e. φ<φ ), there are only three existing ﬁrm types: DB, DA,
and XA, which allows to deﬁne the relevant marginal cost thresholds that pin down the ﬁrm















































We ﬁrst deﬁne all marginal cost thresholds relative to the marginal cost threshold of the least
eﬃcient ﬁrm worldwide aDB:
















This gives an implicit solution for the relative price index:
34  P σ−1 =
1−   aDA
1−σ+ρ+φγ1−σ   aXA
1−σ+ρ




















Rearranging terms, we obtain the following equation, which pins down   P and ensures that
∂   P
∂φ > 0, ∀ φ:
















with h(  P)=
 
γ












The deﬁnition of the price index in country B provides the relation between the threshold



































When trade costs are intermediate (i.e. φ <φ<φ), the four ﬁrm types coexist. We can then












































































35Using the same notations as above, we obtain the deﬁnitions for the relative marginal cost
thresholds:
  aDA =
 










,a n d  aXA =
 









(γ − 1)(CD + CX)
  ρ
σ−1−1
− f(  P)
 
CD
CX − (γ − 1)CD
  ρ
σ−1−1
+ h(  P) − 1=0 (26)








1−σ    
γ
1−σ − φ























which leads again to ∂   P
∂φ > 0, ∀ φ.
Finally, when trade costs are low (i.e. φ>φ), we again only have three active ﬁrm types:






















































The relative price index is now given by:
h(  P) − f(  P)
 
CD (γ − 1)








we get ∂   P
∂φ > 0, ∀ φ.
36